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2. Playland : Technology, self, and cultural 
transformation
Kenneth J. Gergen
I opened the morning newspaper and was greeted with a front-page, banner-
size headline and photo touting the dramatic win of the city’s professional 
football team. The account of the game bristled with excitement. In smaller 
print at the top of the page was a report on the winning ways of a local 
basketball team. It was only in the nether regions of the page that I discov-
ered reports on national and international affairs, all properly phrased in 
the monochromatic tones of impartial objectivity. Struck by the attention 
given to matters of sport, I became curious about the general content of the 
newspaper. Interestingly, the sports section proved to be substantially larger 
than the f irst and principal news section. The entertainment section also 
exceeded the size of the f inancial section. If I subtracted the advertisements 
from the pages, the portion of the paper devoted to playful matters was more 
than twice that of what one might call serious news. A few months later, an 
editorial in the paper opined that the name of this winning football team 
“is not only a piece of the town’s; it also conjures its essence”.
This composition of the news may be commonplace in today’s world. 
But it was not so in the world of my youth, nor it seems in previous history. 
I have long appreciated the work of Johan Huizinga, whose classic study of 
play explored its deep historical roots (Huizinga 1938). Yet in making his 
case for a primordial basis of play, Huizinga primarily focused on somewhat 
raref ied cultural patterns, such as symbolic rituals, rites, and ceremonies. 
He also found play elements in battles, legal proceedings, and the arts. 
Play seemed omnipresent, but secreted into the interstices of cultural life. 
My curiosity increased. Is a shift in cultural investments now in motion, 
and if so, is it an important one? Has play truly become the dominant 
cultural activity? A scanning of statistics on professional sports in the US 
was provocative. Just in professional baseball, the gross revenues reached 
a record-breaking $7 billion in 2010. As the Major League Baseball Com-
missioner Bud Selig announced: “This is the golden era for the sport, and 
given the (weak) economy this may be the most remarkable year we ever 
had. We’re at numbers nobody ever thought possible”. Paid attendance at 
the baseball games was over 73 million. For professional football, revenue 
was almost $8 billion, with 26 million paid fans and a television audience 
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of at least 500 times this number. Then there are the basketball and hockey 
seasons to consider, among others. When we consider the professional 
sports industry altogether, the gross revenues reached $414 billion in 2010. 
This f igure exceeded the total revenues of the combined governments of 
Costa Rica, India, Lithuania, Bolivia, Chile, Finland, Morocco, Romania, 
and Pakistan during the same period.
Yet, I asked, is this interest restricted only to professional sports? Unlikely, 
since there is also an enormous interest in the US in college football and 
basketball. And in terms of games, we also f ind lively interest in golf, tennis, 
auto racing, and soccer (with independent cable channels exclusively dedi-
cated to sports for continuous viewing), along with skiing, casino gambling, 
horse racing, gymnastics, skateboarding, online gambling, televised poker, 
and fantasy sports. Nor do I believe that investments in these activities 
begin to capture the extent of the gaming activity.
However, the most dramatic developments are surely in the virtual 
world. A homely example is telling, important as well, in suggesting that 
the shift toward play is not solely an American phenomenon. When visiting 
friends in the Netherlands, I was told that they were to entertain their 
grandchildren for the afternoon. Later, the two boys, three and f ive, burst 
into the house, and without more than a nodding acknowledgement of the 
assembled gathering raced upstairs. Their destination: the two computers 
in the upstairs off ice. Within minutes they were both absorbed in online 
games. They were allowed to remain so for an hour, at which point their 
cruel grandmother pulled the switch. It was human time again.
Such an event will scarcely be surprising to any young parents. At the 
present time, there are over 200 million websites related to computer games. 
One of these sites, chosen at random, offers 1,500 games, and has over 70,000 
participants. Another offers games in over 40 languages. Players on the mas-
sively multiplayer online games such as those featured on Facebook and other 
social network sites, cater to over one hundred million participants a year. The 
participants spend over $1 billion annually. Video games, such as those sold 
for Xbox, garner far greater income. Revenues of video games now exceed 20 
billion dollars internationally. Over 20 million players have spent 17 billion 
hours on Xbox Live, which is more than 2 hours for every person on the planet. 
Another 40 million users have registered PlayStation Network accounts.1
Among the major characteristics of games, as defined by scholars such as 
Huizinga (1938) and Caillois (1958), are that they are non-income producing 
activities, non-obligatory, and circumscribed in space and time. Further, 
as they see it, there are rules of participation (either explicit or implicit). 
Participation, in turn, evokes an alternative reality, a reality that has the 
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capacity to enchant or captivate. Def ined in this way, it is legitimate to 
include within the cultural shift toward play, the shared indulgences in 
TV drama, movies, YouTube, online porn, pop music, romance novels, and 
social networks. On Facebook alone there are almost 650 million visitors 
in any given month, twice the size of the US population. As Timmermans 
(2010) and Pearson (2009) both describe, online activities are essentially 
playful. To summarize, it is useful to distinguish among three forms of play:
1. Social play, which constitutes the vast majority of communication taking 
place in social networks. Communication in this context not only creates 
a playful ambience, but it is also a place where people communicate about 
both spectator and participatory play thereby enhancing their significance.
2. Spectator play, which constitutes the vast range of spectator pleasures, 
as facilitated by television, movies, magazines, newspapers, and radio.
3. Competitive play, which consists of an enormous range of participatory 
competitive games including both electronic and organic games.
Let us characterize the general shift in cultural investments of attention, 
time, and money in these three spheres in terms of Playland, denoting a 
world in which the dominant cultural activities – along with the mean-
ing these activities give to life – center on participation, either vicarious 
or active, in the forms of play.2 If this lens of viewing cultural life carries 
legitimacy, numerous questions follow. How are we to understand, for one, 
the historical shift in cultural interests and investments? Further, putting 
aside the redistribution of time and money, what are the implications 
for cultural life? What becomes of relationships – with friends, family, 
community, and the like? Are there implications for the ways in which we 
come to understand ourselves, and the meaning of our lives? If the cultural 
implications are unsettling, what then follows in terms of action – both 
personal and in terms of policy?
In what follows I wish to open discussion on two domains of impact: the self 
and human relationships. The issues are both complex and profound, and in a 
circumscribed context such as the present, I can do little more than scan the 
terrain. My hope is that such a perambulating treatment can invite the kind 
of dialogue that will facilitate broad illumination and new forms of action.
The emergence of playland
Let us f irst consider possible reasons for what appears to be a major shift in 
cultural life. That play should come into such signif icance could be viewed 
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as highly surprising. In much of Western culture, and in the US in particular, 
the number of hours devoted to work has steadily increased. Indeed, in 
the US there is currently an attempt to establish a “Take Back Your Time” 
day, a day devoted to restoring leisure hours to the American worker. The 
manifesto of this movement points out, “an epidemic of over-work, over-
scheduling and time famine now threatens our health, our families and 
relationships, our communities and our environment”. Clearly, then, there 
are signif icant changes in the ways in which leisure hours are f illed (and 
as we shall see, various venues of play have inf iltrated the spaces of work). 
One might also reason that with increments in daily work demands, there 
might be a compensatory desire for play. By indulging in play – vicarious 
or active – tedium can be relieved and cares forgotten. I think now of the 
pivotal place that pachinko parlors play in Japanese life, for many years one 
of the few forms of escapist entertainment available to compensate for the 
rigors of a six-day workweek.
One cannot rule out the compensatory explanation for the burgeoning 
of play in contemporary culture. However, in my view, the chief driver of 
this cultural shift is the coalition of technology and business. Technological 
developments open new and highly lucrative business opportunities, and as 
these businesses profit, they also spawn new developments in technology. 
The impact of these twin forces must also be seen against a cultural and 
historical background. On the one hand, following Huizinga, there is a rich 
history of engagement in forms of play, and most relevant, forms of play that 
are contentious, in which protagonists are embattled or striving to achieve 
dominance over the other. As Roland Barthes (1972) has also pointed out, 
there is a strong tendency in this context to conflate issues of good and 
evil with winning and losing. One “f ights” to achieve some end, and this 
end is often saturated with moral value. In effect, games possess enormous 
potential as resources for generating morally saturated drama. As Goldstein 
(1994) has pointed out, the blueprint for such drama is typically established 
within the f irst three years of life when one is developmentally prepared 
for rapt engagement in forms of play
Now, one may also argue that the number and range of real-life dramas 
is such that adults have little need for contrived games. In traditional terms, 
participation in play is considered essential to childhood development. 
However it is also thought that as one matures, play should be largely 
replaced by the active responsibilities of adult life. And these responsi-
bilities – succeeding at work, achieving happiness in one’s relationships, 
raising children, attending to issues of public importance, and the like – are 
loaded with dramatic significance. In each case, there is success and failure, 
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progress and decline, winning and losing, and good vs. evil. Why should 
these not f ill the available space of dramatic engagement? Why should such 
dramas not demand our full attention? In my view, the answer lies in the 
ambiguities of the narrative forms that make drama possible.
To expand, in an earlier work (Gergen 1992) I proposed that the communi-
cation technologies of today facilitate the development of multiple meaning 
making clusters, that is, groups of people that co-construct visions of the 
real and the good. There are increasing numbers of groups – professional, 
political, religious, and so on – that make claims to “having it right” about 
the world. Simultaneously, these same technologies – now in the form of 
everyday media – saturate us with these various visions. For example, the 
question of how to invest one’s savings has dramatic implications. One can 
win or lose, and the outcomes will make a significant difference to the qual-
ity of one’s future life. Yet there are now scores of books treating the topic 
of investment, along with daily radio and television commentators, and 
stockbrokers and money managers who also provide informed decisions. 
The problem, however, is that there is substantial disagreement among 
these sources and opinions shift daily. In effect, there is no rational decision. 
Almost every choice is wise and unwise, promising and perilous. When 
life is a random walk, drama dissolves. The same can be said regarding 
many policy issues from the local to the national level. With the legion of 
talking heads thriving on contention, there is little clarity on whether we 
are progressing or regressing at any point. In the crush of disagreement, 
drama is dissipated.
Given this context, let us return to the twin impact of technology and 
business on the growth of playland culture. Consider the following: Tech-
nologies allow unlimited, low-cost participation in high-drama activities. 
Because of their relatively low costs, technologies such as television, the 
Internet, radio, cell phones, and video games are available to large and ever 
increasing sectors of the population. The most widely televised event in the 
history of the world was the 2010 World Cup. The Xbox game Call of Duty: 
Black Ops, was issued late in 2010, and now one will encounter at any time 
of day or night over a million fellow players – from all corners of the earth.
Technologies intensify the dramatic narratives (e.g. video games, profes-
sional sports). With the development of microscopic microchip technology, 
it became possible to increase dramatically the dimensions of electronic 
communication. The video industry is increasingly capable of generating 
realistic, life and death, sound-accompanied games. The dramatic engage-
ment is intense. With the increasingly popular Nintendo Wii games, indeed 
the entire body is engaged in the game.
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In terms of narrative meaning, most games offer increased opportunities 
for heroism. Games are typically about winning or losing, and accolades 
are reserved for those who win. Even those computer and cell phone games 
that demand hours of effort to increase one’s skill offer the player steady 
increments in esteem for the self (Gee 2005). Further, even in the case 
of spectator games, fans take vicarious pleasure in identifying with the 
star players. Stories of “the stars” are everyday fare in newspapers and 
magazines, essentially generating the new cultural myths about men and 
women who are enshrined in the increasingly numerous “halls of fame”. In 
playland, games offer continuous opportunities for homely heroism. Either 
vicariously or interactively, one becomes the major protagonist in the story.
In the narratives of daily life, play is highly consequential. Marriage and 
career success may hang in the balance, or on the national sphere, the games 
of war can bring death to hundreds of thousands. In playland, however, 
the drama is intense, but the consequences are minimal. In most video 
and computer games, one is continuously losing, but the loss serves only as 
an invitation to improve with the next turn. In the Call of Duty: Black Ops 
game, a player may be killed a dozen times within a f ive-minute period, 
only to rise each time from his prone position to resume the attack. One 
plays without the public shame of losing and without bodily risk.
As many commentators have argued, with the growth of modernism, and 
particularly with the spread of the scientif ic worldview, our capacities for 
enchantment have dwindled.3 The prizing of objectivity – with its value-free 
approach to the world – demolishes drama. If there is nothing to value – no 
goals, no ideals, no transcendent virtues – then what is worth doing? The 
religions of the world continue to be sources of enchantment. However, in 
comparison to the enchanting power of games in the world today, religions 
are a poor competitor. There is a further catalyst to incitement in the form 
of social interchange. As games enchant, so do they invite conversation. 
And within conversation the game deepens in signif icance. It is an event 
about which people care, and thus, for example, the enormous crowds so 
dramatically engaged in the outcome of the World Cup.
We now turn to the question of cultural impact. Other than the obvi-
ous redistribution of time and money, in what ways is cultural life being 
transformed? How shall we regard these transformations, and are there 
ways in which we might alter our current behavior, from the forms of daily 
relations to national or global policy? If, as Huizinga proposes, “culture 
arises in the form of play,” how are we to understand the emerging culture 
and how best to go on? These are scarcely new issues. For example, there 
has been considerable discussion about the impact of games on the brain 
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and our capacities for thought,4 along with discussions of the educational 
potential of electronic games.5 More expansively, Dyer-Witheford and de 
Peuter (2009) have linked the gaming ethos to the development of global 
capitalism, corporate exploitation, and militarism. These are issues of such 
complexity that traditional attempts to establish clear answers are no longer 
relevant. Rather, the desire for certainty must be replaced by reflective and 
sustained dialogue. And such dialogue itself will alter the complexion of 
the phenomenon, since the phenomenon is not separate from the dialogue 
that sustains it. In this spirit, I wish to touch on only two issues: the self 
and relationships.
The playing self
In earlier writings I have been concerned with what may be viewed as an 
erosion in the Western conception of the self-contained individual, that is, 
the agent whose mental resources serve (or should serve) as an originary 
and eff icacious source of action.6 In part, I have traced this erosion to the 
increasingly dominant technologies of communication and the enormous 
increments in the relational processes they invite. As one’s sense of self is 
increasingly absorbed into networks of relationships, I proposed, the sense 
of oneself as inherently social replaces that of self as an independent actor. 
In effect, the emerging technologies of the 20th century slowly subvert the 
legacy of the Enlightenment. In large measure I have welcomed this trans-
formation in the conception of the person. Joining in the ongoing critique 
of individualism, I have argued that the vision of the world as composed of 
bounded or singular entities is inimical to human and planetary well-being. 
When relational conceptions of human action are fully extended, they 
invite consideration and appreciation not only of global interdependency, 
but environmental care.
It is within this context that I confront the emergence of playland 
culture. For it seems in this case one might well be inclined to see in this 
movement an extension and intensif ication of the agentive “I”. After all, 
don’t most games celebrate the individual strategist, who aspires to suc-
cess, who vanquishes, who trains, plans, schemes, and carries out tactics 
for the purpose of winning? In the process of playing, personal agency is 
reif ied; individualism is refurbished. I am not denying this possibility, and 
particular gaming structures certainly lend themselves to such a result as 
opposed to others. Yet, in general, I am not persuaded. To explore further, 
I distinguished earlier between three forms of cultural play: social play, 
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spectator play, and competitive games. It is at this f irst level that my case 
for the erosion of the bounded self and the emergence of the relational being 
was largely based. E-mail, Facebook, cell phones, Twitter, and the like, all 
immerse us in the co-constituting process of communication. In each case, 
our actions are inherently “for the other” and without the other they lose 
meaning altogether. To abandon all one’s interlocutors would eviscerate 
one’s sense of self. Yet as Timmermans (2010) notes, the playful ambience 
of social network communication also generates a conflict between the 
impetus toward authenticity on the one hand, and artif ice on the other. 
Paradoxically, one may simultaneously be both sincere and insincere. There 
is erosion in the obdurate sense of self, but not eradication.7
On the level of spectator pleasure, there is also a diminishment of the 
agentive “I”, but the route is different. In this case the dominant pleasure is 
taken from the process of identif ication. While the concept of identif ication 
may be def ined in many ways, I use the term to refer to one’s fantasized 
narrative of self as the other. Because the drama of games is one typically 
featuring success vs. failure, or good vs. evil, the potential for games to 
generate heroic f igures is great. Movie and television dramas yield a similar 
panoply of “gods” and “goddesses”. As a spectator, the identif ication process 
may remain wholly in fantasy, for example, as one excitedly watches a 
favorite athlete perform on TV. However, such fantasies are also made more 
concrete in one’s activities, such as purchasing apparel fetishizing the hero, 
or adopting the hero’s mannerisms, gestures, or ways of life. The important 
point here is that when immersed in spectator pleasures, one brackets the 
sense of authentic being. One lives temporarily as the other.
In both these conditions we f ind an alteration in consciousness from 
the traditional sense of “I am the master of my actions” to an “out-of-self’ 
condition. In the former case, “I am an actor for others”, and in the latter 
case, “I experience as the other”. Let us view these as subtle movements 
in terms of the emergence of a second-order self, a sense of self as other 
than self, or a state of para-being. At the more extreme level, the sense of a 
second-order self may characterize one’s condition under the influence of a 
drug, or when sexually aroused, romantically infatuated, or fully immersed 
in a stage role. One is fully compelled by activities that might be described 
as ego-alien. These activities spin out spontaneously, without deliberate 
thought, and often surprisingly. Now consider the case of competitive 
games: I watch as my 12-year-old grandson sits in a special chair designed 
for online gamers. The chair approximates the seat of a jet f ighter pilot or a 
motorcycle driver. His eyes are focused on the television screen, his hands 
grip precision controls for the events unfolding before him, and the booming 
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sounds of these clamorous events bellow from nearby speakers embedded 
in the chair. This is not “John, my studious grandson, with polite manners, 
tidy room, and careful eating habits”. That John is absent, now replaced by 
a rampant killer, emptying bullets into dark f igures lurking in shadows 
or leaping from doorways, casting grenades across barriers to see bodies 
torn to bits, moving ever forward to slay as many combatants as possible. 
If uninterrupted, he may remain in that state for hours. He will sometimes 
come home early from school because he knows he will have the house 
to himself and can return to the enchantment of the killing f ields. This is 
the intoxication of a second-order self. All the frustrations, ambiguities, 
complexities – along with the possible emptiness – of daily life are removed. 
One lives a thrilling life as a hero with a thousand lives, but returns to the 
dinner table as a dutiful son. To be sure, this is a dramatized account, and it 
is clearly more relevant to some forms of participatory games than others.8 
But virtually all competitive games invite one – for whatever amount of 
time – to become a second-order self.
The increased presence of a second-order being might not be so im-
portant in itself. To play tennis or golf once or twice a week probably has 
little impact on the remainder of one’s life. One plays, and when play is 
terminated, one returns to their everyday demands. However, a closer 
examination is required. There is now substantial literature in the human 
sciences – from the late 19th century to the present – proposing that one of 
the major influences on human development is imitative role-playing. In 
their play, children imitate their parents, for example, and in playing out 
these roles their personalities and potentials are shaped. In the same way, 
when entering a profession, one imitates the behavior of other professionals 
and attempts to play the role of the professional. What is crucial for the 
present chapter, is that out of these processes one’s sense of self emerges. In 
being the other, one becomes oneself. Play gives way to a sense of obdurate 
identity. Consider again the emergence of the playland. As we have seen, 
activities in social networks invite playing with one’s identity, while specta-
tor activities invite the imitation of players and with competitive games, one 
indeed does become a player. With sustained and intense participation in 
playland, the conditions are in place for the emergence of a genuine playing 
self. The sense of a second-order self gives way to a f irst order: “I am a player”.9
As the sense of the playing self gains strength, the states of the authentic 
being become more suspect. To create a series of avatars or game identities 
poses little problem; with chameleon-like ease, one can f it congenially into 
the game at hand. Within the individualist tradition, with its emphasis on 
authenticity, one might choose to play, depending on the outcome; however, 
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as a playing self, one is simply playing without asking questions about the 
outcome. In the same way, one does not choose to breathe the air; breathing 
is just the nature of life. For the playing self, one who calculates daily deci-
sions about work and play may seem naïve. To fancy oneself as a rational 
agent, carefully weighing the outcomes of a decision is foolish: “Don’t you 
know it’s all a game?” Richard Rorty’s (1989) conception of the liberal ironist 
is apt. For Rorty, propositions about the real and the good are without 
rational foundations. And yet those realizing this is so may nevertheless 
commit themselves to the good of relieving suffering in the world. They 
commit themselves to liberal causes understanding full well that there are 
no knockdown arguments for doing so and no rational grounds for their 
commitment. In the same way, in taking issues of life seriously, the playing 
self understands that they are not serious. Or as Oscar Wilde would put it, 
“Deep down he is superf icial”.
As the playing self emerges in cultural life, what are the implications for 
daily life? What is worth doing? On what kind of narrative journey is one 
embarked? In order to treat such issues we must obviously broaden the 
realm of interpretive complexity. As commentators we are immersed in 
the very processes about which we write; we grapple with understanding 
a condition that is not, for us, an object of observation. The hope, however, 
is that by grappling with these ideas we generate resources for collectively 
navigating our way.
With this said, it is my view that with the playing self, the strong indi-
vidualist account of human functioning recedes. One does not ask, in the 
abstract, “What would I like to be?” and look inward for the resources to 
reach this self-determined end. Rather, one recognizes that one is forever 
functioning within a relational context, with other players, with rules and 
expectations, and with offerings of what is possible and what is precluded. 
One may ask about preferred ends within this context, but there is no 
meta-contextual place to stand. The playing self is relationally dependent. 
This does not mean confronting a pre-f ixed world, where one can only 
play within the boundaries of tradition. On the contrary, because one 
understands that one comes into being through play, and that the games 
are created by players, then new games are always a possibility. All that is 
required is another player responding enthusiastically to the invitation, 
“Let’s imagine that...”.
The life-course for the playing self is thus indeterminate. As Timmermans 
(2010) proposes, in the digitalized contexts of the game world the vision 
of a coherent life narrative is no longer compelling. The latter vision is a 
by-product of a textual world. In effect, the playing self is ideally adapted to 
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the technologically driven ethos in which change is continuous and rapid. 
Living disjunctively is not, then, unsettling. Rather, the infinite possibility of 
new and exciting life-games is optimistic and energizing. Does the playing 
self thus lack moral f iber? Is this just a spineless creature for whom anything 
goes? I don’t think so. Rather, one’s existence as a playing self requires the 
presence of a game, and games require for their existence rules of conduct. 
These rules, in turn, contain values – what it is to win and lose, to succeed 
and fail, to play fairly or unfairly. As mentioned earlier, most video games 
are based on a narrative in which heroes are pitted against villains. Thus 
a world of virtue is built into both the content and structure of the game. 
Extrapolating to life outside the game, the playing self would be prone to a 
situated ethics. He or she would be sensitive to local moralities, but would 
be resistant to transcendent moral principles. This means that because the 
rules of a game are ultimately arbitrary, and one ultimately plays to win, 
the situated ethics may run thin. Therefore, bending the rules may be a 
pervasive temptation.
Relationships in playland
Social history sensitizes us to the shifting character of social relationships 
across time. In a previous work, for example, I have traced the corrosive 
effect of 20th century modernism on the romanticist tradition, and explored 
the new potentials opened by the postmodern cultural turn (Gergen 1992; 
2009). What I could not appreciate at the time was the rapid expansion of 
the ludic mentality. How are we to understand contemporary transforma-
tions in relational mores, and how should these be regarded? Again, such 
questions are without culminating answers, and it is to a sustained dialogue 
that we must subscribe. To that end, I touch on only two related issues in 
the present offering: commitment and alienation.
As proposed earlier, the playland ethos does not lend itself to sustaining 
the individualist tradition of the past, but rather, it sets the context for 
diffusion and rebirth as a playing self. As also proposed, for the playing self 
the world is seen through the metaphoric lens of the game. Most important 
in this context, the vast majority of all games require other players – actual 
or simulated. In effect, to be a playing self is to exist in a world not as a lone 
agent, but fundamentally with others. And, as players in all competitive 
games are aware, one does not fully control one’s actions. The success or 
failure of one’s behavior is inherently dependent on the behavior of the other 
(or others). The outcome of any game emerges from the relational process.
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At the same time, the relationship between the playing self and others 
is tenuous. At once, the other is needed (either as a partner in play or a 
team member), but simultaneously he or she serves as (or can become) 
an antagonist whose actions can hasten one’s defeat (or game death). In 
business circles – when one’s allies in a given f ield are also one’s competi-
tors – one speaks of “frenemies”. Thus one may sustain broad regard for one’s 
acquaintances, but they always remain at a distance. Special regard may 
be expressed toward fellow players – a tennis or golf partner, for example. 
However, such regard may frequently be context-specif ic. That is, one may 
spend many enjoyable hours playing with one’s companions, but have little 
or no interest in seeing them outside these times.10
Much the same ambivalence may influence relations that were once 
def ined in terms of depth or commitment: friendships, romantic love, 
and one’s family central among them. Such relations are often viewed as 
bonding, suggesting that one is no longer a free agent. The playing self 
may think little of “free agency”, but bonded commitment is also alien. 
To demand a commitment that transcends the boundaries of a particular 
context would be akin to asking one to serve a tennis ball when seated at 
the bridge table. In contrast to the modernist, for whom deep relationships 
smell of an antiquated and saccharine romanticism, the playing self is 
versatile. He or she can “play at” being the soulmate, a baleful romantic, or 
the adoring father or mother. And in doing it well, one may achieve great 
pleasure. However, these are all situated activities – effectively, games of 
the moment. They are not necessary indicators of cross-time commitments. 
Ample support for this waning of commitment is found in Zygmunt Bau-
man’s Liquid love: On the frailty of human bonds (2003). However, where 
Bauman sees human bonding as a natural desire, I am more inclined to 
view bonding as a cultural tradition that is more or less valued and practiced 
depending on historical conditions. In this case, the playing self may feel 
little anxiety at the deterioration of bonding. Fragility in this case is not a 
threat, but an opportunity.
Although I move here into more conjectural territory, there is a second 
and more menacing movement that demands discussion. Ironically, 
while the playland zeitgeist promotes social engagement, there are also 
ways in which antagonisms are intensif ied. This groundwork is laid by 
the agonistic structure of most games, and the way in which the social 
landscape can so easily be indexed in terms of friends and enemies. With 
relationships in a tenuous condition, others may easily be thrust into 
the latter category. Here I was struck by a recent article in the New York 
Times (5/12/10) reporting on the increasing incidence of digital bullying 
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among young people. They speak of the “cavalier meanness” with which 
adolescents can treat each other on Facebook or by cell phone texting. 
Small cliques will gang up on an individual, and bombard him or her 
with comments like “go cut yourself”, “you are sooo ugly”, “your pic makes 
me throw up”. Swear words like “bitch”, “shit”, and “fuck” are also com-
monplace.11 What also caught me about this article was the response of 
a straight-A student to her mother. Her mother had been notif ied by the 
school that her daughter had been caught making a MySpace page about 
her classmate in middle-school calling her a “whore” and pointing to her 
private parts. The distraught mother rushed to school to f ind her daughter 
at the guidance counselor’s off ice, her arms def iantly crossed. The mother 
pleaded for her daughter to consider the impact of this page on her victim’s 
feelings. “This is a human being… This girl will be destroyed for the rest 
of her life!” The daughter sullenly replied: “I don’t care, It’s all true”. The 
weeks following at home were marked by arguments, recriminations, 
screaming, and slammed doors.
It is this latter schism that particularly concerns me. I f ind from countless 
parents that their relationships with their adolescent children are fraught 
with antagonism. Their admonishments do not yield compliance, or even 
silent resistance. Rather, a very likely response is a full volley of vituperation, 
replete with oaths that the parents never once uttered in the company of 
family. Adolescence in Western culture has long been a diff icult period for 
family relationships. However, we seem to have entered a period of extreme 
distance and disrespect. In my view, the emergence of playland culture 
brings with it a broad generational schism. With the early technologies of 
television, f ilms, radio, and mass publications, the adult population was 
essentially immersed in spectator pleasure. Competitive play was limited, 
and the techno-mediated context of play fully absent. However, for two 
decades now, social and competitive play have radically increased, and 
the younger generations are the major participants. Electronic games and 
social networking for pleasure are predominantly activities of the younger 
generations. As Chatf ield (2010) reports, for example, 99% of teenage boys 
and 94% of teenage girls in the US have played video games. Adolescents 
are also unlikely to allow their parents access to their Facebook sanctuary 
(though parents over the age of 30 are not likely to participate in Facebook 
at all). The result is the emergence of a generation gap in which respect for 
elders is receding. Not only do the older generations not understand the 
technology, they have little knowledge or appreciation of the lived worlds 
of the young. For the older generations, in turn, the young begin to appear 
both shallow and uncivilized.
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Playland and society
These brief explorations into emerging forms of cultural life – focusing 
on self and relationships – also invite expanded discussion. Again, my 
concern here is not with the shifts taking place in the way people spend 
their time and money. More important, in my view, are the broader trans-
formations taking place. In the case of both self-conception and relational 
patterning, the impact of playland activities is direct. Engagement in 
play is itself transforming. However, the ripple effects of such activities 
are of far greater magnitude. Here I call attention to what may be called 
metaphoric drift. By this I mean the way in which the imagery of the game 
becomes the means by which we understand, enact, and thus transform 
other forms of life. In the case of games, metaphoric drift is represented, for 
example, in the way many organizations def ine their members as a team, 
or more threateningly, the way in which video games come to resemble 
war games, and actual war may come to be viewed as play. To illustrate, 
global combat has now become the basis for the Military Channel on 
television. The channel features videos on machine guns, special ops, Nazi 
hunting, snipers, and so on – in effect, reconstituting human slaughter 
as entertainment. The website for the channel includes, as well, a range 
of games that parallel the television fare. An iPhone game enables one to 
“earn a sniper license”, another enables one to test their f irepower skills. 
At the same time, over 11 million people worldwide play the video game 
World of Warcraft. The contemporary echoes of “Oh! What a Lovely War” 
become ominous.
Equally unsettling reverberations accompany the entry of gaming 
metaphors into economics and politics. In many respects the gaming 
metaphor has already entered the economic world. Early on, the popular 
game Monopoly sensitized generations to the ludic character of winning 
and losing money, and economic game theory informed the practices of 
strategic management. However, in recent years the metaphoric drift has 
become accentuated. Already by 1994, business executive Jack Stack wrote 
the popular book The great game of business. However, a spate of books 
has recently emerged showing how the concept and practice of gaming is 
being instituted within the business world.12 Games are currently being 
used, for example, to reach new customers, build brands, recruit and 
retain employees, and drive innovation. Reeves and Read (2009) propose 
that game training can provide vital preparation for participating in the 
contemporary business world. In effect, they wish to use games to change 
the way people work and do business. Business literally becomes a game. 
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It is this mentality that many believe informed cultures of f inance and 
banking in their inviting the stock market collapse of 2008-09. Without 
strict oversight, investment banks such as Goldman Sachs hesitated little 
to use fraud in rigging the market in their favor. Banks did not hesitate 
to inf late the housing market, fully understanding that the short-term 
gains would ultimately lead to disaster. If business is a game for business 
players, the point is not to benef it the society, but at any cost, to win at 
business!
The game metaphor had drifted into the political arena long before 
the emergence of playland. With the establishment of a democracy in 
which political parties vied for power, the metaphors of the battle and 
the game were ready at hand. In present times, phrases such as winning 
and losing the political “race”, “playing hardball”, “the political game”, and 
“playing politics” have shifted from the domain of metaphor to the literal.13 
Although the play element in American politics was noted in Huizinga’s 
1938 book, its influence has now become alarming in its proportions. The 
problem in part is the conflation of the good/evil dichotomy dominating 
the game tradition with political party differences. Civil debate has been 
replaced by public acrimony, with the political rhetoric so intensely hostile 
that it has become associated with deadly assaults. (A recent cover of The 
Economist pictures political debaters with pistols replacing their tongues.) 
The intense and absorbing contest between mirror images of good and 
evil also brings about an indifference to the complexities of policy issues. 
Matters of public good are overlooked and the sole aim becomes defeating 
one’s opponent.
While we are concerned here primarily with cultural deficits, we should 
not conclude that the playland transformation is altogether negative. 
Much has been written about the various skills engendered by video and 
computer game playing, along with the positive uses of games in educa-
tion and training.14 However, it is also important to consider the positive 
potential in terms of broader cultural patterns. For example, games not 
only generate divisions among people (e.g. my team, political party, my 
nation vs. your nation), but they can also serve to unite people who would 
otherwise be apart. People from diverse economic classes, educational 
backgrounds, and ethnicities unite around a favorite team; players even 
from the poorest background with suff icient athletic skill can become 
national idols in a culture; adolescents from around the globe meet together 
in virtual space to form teams. For every division, there is also inclusion. 
There is also a way in which the gaming zeitgeist can undermine all forms 
of fundamentalism. As one begins to understand cultural life as made 
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up of gaming sites (e.g. corporate life as a game, law as a game, science 
as a game), there is a loosening of belief in any tradition of intelligibility. 
Rather than understanding statements of what is true, real, or rational as 
foundationally grounded, they all become rhetorics of reality. This is es-
sentially the view taken by James Carse in his 1986 work, Finite and infinite 
games: A vision of life as play and possibility. When life is viewed in terms 
of playscripts, then one may be liberated from the grasp of any particular 
playscript and one can play with the forms of play. This mentality is also 
reflected in the emerging critique within the cyber-community of the work 
ethic, the privatization and commodif ication of information, music, and 
art, and the decline in economic pursuits as the major goal of life. Among 
the most potent documents is Pat Kane’s The play ethic: A manifesto for a 
different way of living (2004). Here he argues for transforming the world of 
work, education, and spirituality so that play is at its center. Play takes on 
an ethical dimension.
In conclusion
In this chapter I propose that a major transformation is taking place in 
Western culture, one in which play is not only becoming a central activ-
ity, but in which play increasingly serves as the organizing metaphor for 
human activity. This ludif ication of culture results in part from low-cost 
communication technologies that make dramatically engaging activities 
available non-stop to increasing sectors of the population. Participation 
in games is both vicarious and participatory, and is amplif ied by the 
play-like ambience of social network activities. Such a transformation 
invites attention to the broad ramif ications for cultural life. My central 
concern in this chapter is with the implications for self-conception and 
social relationships. Here I have outlined the emergence of a playing self, 
the sense that one is fundamentally a performer within a life of game-like 
activities. This sense of self places a strong value on relationship, but the 
value of authentic commitment gives way to temporary pleasure. I have 
also touched on ways in which the metaphor of play increasingly inhabits 
the major institutions of society, including government, business, and 
education. While it is tempting to be critical of such a transformation, such 
a critique largely reflects on investments in the ontologies and values of 
pre-game cultural life. This is not to discount such a critique, but to invite 
a continuous dialogue that also takes into account the positive potential 
of life in playland.
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Notes
1. For a detailed account of the burgeoning of game playing and its commer-
cial success, see Chatfield (2010).
2. Social commentators such as Berger (2002) and Kent (2001) have also made 
a strong case for a major cultural change on the basis of engagements in 
computer and video games alone. Wark (2007) sees video games as leading 
to utopian cultural life. 
3. See Sayler’s (2006) review.
4. See, for example, Healy (1999), Carr (2010), and Winn (2002).
5. Illustrative are Devlin (2011), McGonigal (2011), and Squire (2011).
6. See, for example, Gergen (1992; 2009). 
7. See also Wellman (2001) on networked individualism, and de Lange (2010) 
on mobile media and playful identities. 
8. The reader should consult Bissell’s (2010) firsthand account of his own hyp-
notic immersion in video games. 
9. In the Freudian sense neither functions on the reality principle, nor on the 
pleasure principle, but on an imaginary principle, “what if?”. It should also 
be noted that the phrase “playing self” has also been used in the English 
translation of Melucci’s work Il gioco dell’io (1991). However, his use of the 
term has totally different implications.
10. Contemporary retirement communities in the US are typically built around 
a complex of golf courses, tennis courts, and swimming pools. It is primarily 
through games that one becomes a neighbor.
11. As Aboujaoude (2011) cogently argues, the Internet allows one to attack oth-
ers without having to confront their pain. Moreover, one is free to fantasize 
aggression without ego-controls that might be enhanced by the presence of 
others. 
12. See, for example, Beck and Wade (2004); Connors and Smith (2011); Edery 
and Mollick (2010); Reeves and Read (2009); Zicherman and Linder (2010).
13. For extended examples of the metaphor in action see Heileman and Halp-
erin (2009) and Mathews (2010).
14. See, for example, Gee (2005) and Griffiths (2002).
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